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REFORMING THE SENTENCING 
REGIME FOR THE MOST SERIOUS 
CRIMES OF CONCERN: THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE 
LUBANGA TRIAL 
INTRODUCTION 
he International Criminal Court has never been more 
important than it is today; especially considering the up-
coming trial of President Kenyatta of Kenya, charges against 
individuals who worked with Muammar Gaddafi, and a war-
rant of arrest for Joseph Kony of the Lords Resistance Army.1 
Governed by the Rome Statute, the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC” or “Court”) has become a true judicial force in the 
world and “is the first permanent, treaty based, international 
criminal court established to help end impunity for the perpe-
trators of the most serious crimes of concern to the internation-
al community.”2 Established in 2002,3 the Court did not hear 
its first case until 2008 in the trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
(“Lubanga”), a Congolese warlord accused of the war crimes of 
conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen and 
using them to actively participate in hostilities.4 On March 14, 
2012, a guilty verdict was returned for Lubanga and conse-
quently, on July 10, 2012, Lubanga was the first person ever 
sentenced by the ICC.5 The Lubanga trial granted the ICC the 
chance to set a strong precedent in its sentencing jurispru-
dence. However, instead of sending a clear message to other 
																																																																																																																												
 1. Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20
cases.aspx. 
 2. About the Court, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (emphasis 
added). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Marlise Simons, International Court Begins First Trial, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 27, 2009, at A10; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Judgment Hearing, 12 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1380068.pdf. 
 5. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Hearing, 
at 12. 
T
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grave offenders, the ICC sentenced Lubanga to only the mini-
mum required by statute.6 
International criminal tribunals have often been plagued by 
inconsistency and leniency in sentencing.7 With the ICC’s first 
case and sentencing, a true legal lens has been provided to 
evaluate similar shortcomings of the Court’s statutory sentenc-
ing guidelines. This Note explores the ICC’s statutory sentenc-
ing guidelines in the wake of the Lubanga trial and argues that 
in its attempt to build from the tribulations of prior interna-
tional tribunals, the ICC has unfortunately failed to consider 
penal theories and to set forth the appropriate penalty frame-
work for those convicted of the most serious international 
crimes. Specifically, when mitigating factors that decrease the 
sentence require less proof than aggravating factors,8 the re-
sulting sentence is increasingly lenient, especially because 
there are no mandatory minimums to counteract this effect. 
Hence, the ICC is wrongly governed by a thirty-year maximum 
sentence as opposed to mandatory minimum sentences, as it 
inadequately balances mitigating and aggravating factors, and 
ignores guidance from the complementary laws of the nations 
involved. 
Part I provides background pertaining to the Rome Statute, 
the jurisdiction of the ICC, and the crimes committed by 
Lubanga. Part II provides a comparative overview of other in-
ternational tribunals, the United States Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, and the theories of punishment as applied in sev-
																																																																																																																												
 6. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for sig-
nature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Article 
78(3) states that the imprisonment sentence “shall be no less than the high-
est individual sentence pronounced and shall not exceed 30 years imprison-
ment.” Id. art. 78(3). 
 7. See Andrew N. Keller, Punishment for Violations of International 
Criminal Law: An Analysis of Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR, 12 IND. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 53, 57–74 (2001); Jennifer J. Clark, Note, Zero to Life: 
Sentencing Appeals at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 96 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1707 (2008); Mark A. Drumbl, 
Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass 
Atrocity, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 539, 554 (2005). 
 8. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to De-
liver the Decision, 4 (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1440143.pdf. As explored later in Part II, mitigating 
factors must be proved by a balancing of the probabilities, whereas aggravat-
ing factors must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
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eral domestic sentencing regimes. Part III applies the punish-
ment theories to the ICC to analyze how the thirty-year maxi-
mum sentence, joint sentence limitations, and inadequate bal-
ance of mitigating and aggravating factors ultimately frustrate 
any potential penal justifications for the ICC’s sentencing prac-
tices. Part IV considers the failure of the Rome Statute to in-
clude deference to domestic laws as an additional guiding 
mechanism. Finally, Part V recommends that the thirty-year 
maximum sentence should be abolished, mitigating and aggra-
vating factors should require the same standard of proof, and 
deference should be given to the laws of the nation that was 
harmed by the crime. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Establishment and Purpose of the International Criminal 
Court 
The ICC is seen as “the culmination of international efforts to 
replace impunity with accountability.”9 The establishment of 
an international criminal court had periodically been consid-
ered since the 1948 General Assembly meeting of the United 
Nations.10 Following World War II, the world witnessed the 
Nuremberg trials, the first attempt at international prosecu-
tion and criminal accountability for the crimes of the Holo-
caust.11 However, it was not until the early 1990s that the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) were 
																																																																																																																												
 9. Anna Triponel & Stephen Pearson, African States and the Internation-
al Criminal Court: A Silent Revolution in International Criminal Law, 12 J.L. 
& SOC. CHALLENGES 65, 66 (2010). 
 10. Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 
2013). Following the Holocaust, genocide was a dominant international con-
cern. Id. This concern led many states to adopt the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment on the Crime of Genocide. Id. Additionally, the Gen-
eral Assembly issued a resolution stating that “[r]ecognizing that at all peri-
ods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and being con-
vinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, inter-
national co-operation is required.” Id. 
 11. Andrew Dubinsky, Note, An Examination of International Sentencing 
Guidelines and a Proposal for Amendments to the International Criminal 
Court’s Sentencing Structure, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
609, 617–18 (2007). 
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created to deal with the mass genocides of these respective re-
gions.12 The international attention that was rendered by these 
tribunals, and the realization that mass atrocities continued 
throughout the world, finally fueled the creation of the ICC.13 
In 1998, the General Assembly convened in Rome, Italy for 
over a month “to finalize and adopt a convention on the estab-
lishment of” the ICC.14 The statute establishing and governing 
the ICC, entitled the Rome Statute, went into effect on July 1, 
2002 after ratification by the necessary sixty states.15 The ICC 
was seen as the “missing link in the international legal sys-
tem.”16 Unlike the International Court of Justice at The Hague, 
which handles civil cases between states, the ICC would deal 
with individual criminal liability as an “enforcement mecha-
nism” against human rights violations that often go unpun-
ished.17 
B. Bringing Perpetrators of International Crimes before the 
ICC: The Rome Statute, Jurisdiction, and Sentencing Guide-
lines 
The Rome Statute is divided into thirteen parts ranging from 
the establishment of the Court and its jurisdiction, to the in-
vestigation, trial, penalties, appeals, and enforcement of the 
Court.18 The thirteen parts, in total, contain the 128 articles 
																																																																																																																												
 12. Id. at 610–13. 
 13. Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 10. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Alicia Mazurek, Note, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: The Inter-
national Criminal Court as It Brings Its First Case to Trial, 86 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 535, 536 (2009). 
 16. Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 10. 
 17. Id. Another key difference between the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) and the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”) is the com-
pulsory nature of the courts. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for 
an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 14 (1991). 
Since the ICJ only hears civil disputes between states, and never between 
individuals of different states, there are unique political sensitivities that 
arise. Id. This is why the ICJ provides member states “the choice of compul-
sory or voluntary submission to jurisdiction.” Id. However, since the ICC has 
jurisdiction over individuals, political sensitivities are of a “much lesser na-
ture.” Id. 
 18. Rome Statute, supra note 6. The statute is specifically divided as fol-
lows: Establishment of the Court; Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable 
Law; General Principles of Criminal Law; Composition and Administration of 
the Court; Investigation and Prosecution; The Trial; Penalties; Appeal and 
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that govern the ICC.19 Article 3 establishes the seat of the 
Court at The Hague in the Netherlands, and later Article 62 
sets forth the seat of the Court as the place of trial, unless oth-
erwise decided.20 
The Rome Statute establishes the structure of the ICC 
through the judicial divisions, the Presidency, the Office of the 
Prosecutor, and the Registry.21 There are currently eighteen 
judges who are divided amongst the three judicial divisions of 
Pre-trial, Trial, and Appeals. 22  Three judges are elected to 
make up the presidency and are responsible for the proper ad-
ministration of the Court.23 The Office of the Prosecutor acts as 
an independent and separate organ of the Court and is “re-
sponsible for receiving referrals and any substantiated infor-
mation on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, for exam-
ining them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions 
before the Court.”24 Finally, the Registry handles administra-
tive and “non-judicial aspects” of the ICC. 25  Other “semi-
autonomous offices . . . fall under the Registry for administra-
tive purposes,” including the Office of Public Counsel for Vic-
tims, and the Office of Public Counsel for Defense.26 
1. Jurisdiction 
The Rome Statute sets forth crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court, as well as how individual criminal acts may fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.27 The most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community are defined in Arti-
																																																																																																																												
Revision; International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance; Enforcement; 
Assembly of States Parties; Financing; and Final Clauses. Id. 
 19. Rome Statute, supra note 6. 
 20. Id. art. 3, 62. 
 21. Id. art. 34. 
 22. Id. art. 39; Structure of the Court, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/Pages/structure%20of%
20the%20court.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
 23. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 38; Structure of the Court, supra note 
22. 
 24. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 15; Structure of the Court, supra note 
22. 
 25. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 43; Structure of the Court, supra note 
22. 
 26. Structure of the Court, supra note 22. 
 27. Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 12–13. 
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cle 5, which grants the Court jurisdiction over international 
disputes, including crimes of genocide, crimes against humani-
ty, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.28 However, even 
for individuals who committed these crimes, there are still sev-
eral preconditions that must be satisfied before the ICC has 
jurisdiction over a case. 
The first hurdle that must be overcome for jurisdiction is rati-
fication of the Rome Statute.29 Once a state ratifies the Rome 
Statute, it grants the ICC jurisdiction over two types of indi-
viduals: first, citizens of that state, and second, any noncitizen 
who commits an Article 5 crime within that state.30 In effect, 
the ICC may have jurisdiction over citizens of nonmember 
states and this remains a controversial issue.31 One such con-
troversy includes the United States, which has not ratified the 
Rome Statute, but has enacted legislation in an attempt to 
avoid jurisdiction of the ICC over its citizens who commit Arti-
cle 5 crimes in other states.32 
The second hurdle that must be overcome for the ICC to exer-
cise jurisdiction is the precondition of “complementarity.”33 The 
principle of “complementarity” requires that states “utilize the 
Court only as a last resort, after first attempting to litigate ICC 
																																																																																																																												
 28. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 5. The specific crime that Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo is charged with is found in Article 8 where war crimes are 
defined. As defined in Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi), “war crimes” means “[o]ther seri-
ous violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed con-
flict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of 
the following acts: . . . [c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of 
fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate ac-
tively in hostilities.” Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi). 
 29. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 12. 
 30. See id. art. 12–13; BARRY E. CARTER & ALLEN S. WEINER, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1141, 1145 (6th ed. 2011). 
 31. See CARTER & WEINER, supra note 30, at 1145–47. 
 32. Id. at 1142–45. In 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the American Ser-
vice-Members’ Protection Act, “which barred the United States from cooperat-
ing with the ICC.” Id. at 1142. “The law also . . . authorized the President to 
use ‘all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release’ of Amer-
icans held by or for the ICC.” Id. Other states have taken issue with these 
objections, finding them misconstrued and unnecessary because other proce-
dural safeguards, such as the prerequisites to jurisdiction, remain in place. 
Id. at 1143. 
 33. Rome Statute, supra note 6, pmbl. The preamble states, “the Interna-
tional Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary 
to national criminal jurisdictions.” Id. 
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crimes domestically in their local courts.”34 It is only after the 
state is “unwilling or unable” to charge the individuals who vio-
lated Article 5 in their own domestic courts that the ICC may 
exercise jurisdiction over the case.35 
After the state is “unwilling or unable,” there are several 
ways that the ICC Prosecutor may become aware of and inves-
tigate a claim. First, a state party may refer a situation to the 
ICC Prosecutor.36 Second, the Security Council of the United 
Nations may also choose to refer a situation to the ICC Prose-
cutor.37 And third, the ICC Prosecutor may investigate on its 
own initiative based on any other information it has received.38 
Regardless of the means used to initiate an investigation, so 
long as the matter involves a potential defendant who is either 
a citizen of a state party, or committed the Article 5 crime in 
the territory of a state party, the ICC may accept the case.39 
Hence, with 122 state parties to the ICC, a necessary system 
has been established for referring situations to the ICC Prose-
																																																																																																																												
 34. Triponel & Pearson, supra note 9, at 67. 
 35. Id. A sham trial conducted by a state would not satisfy this require-
ment, and the state would be deemed unwilling or unable to prosecute the 
case. CARTER & WEINER, supra note 30, at 1143. 
 36. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 14. Also note that “situation” is the 
general terminology used for any matter that may result in a potential case. 
See Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Prosecutor 
Receives Referral of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Apr. 
19, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/ 
situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/press% 
20releases/Pages/prosecutor%20receives%20referral%20of%20the%20situatio
n%20in%20the%20democratic%20republic%20of%20congo.aspx. For example, 
in Lubanga’s case, the President of the DRC initially sent a letter to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC “referring to him the situation of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed anywhere in the territory of the 
DRC since the entry into force of the Rome Statute.” Id. Hence, this falls 
within a state party referring the “situation” to the Prosecutor to further in-
vestigate and determine if one or more persons should be charged with such 
crimes. Id. In comparison, for the more recent “situation” involving the Re-
public of Kenya, the Prosecutor submitted a request to Kenya to begin an 
investigation on its own initiative. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case 
No. ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
4 (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf. 
 37. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 13. 
 38. Id. art. 15. 
 39. Id. art. 13–15. 
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cutor where the state was “unable or unwilling” to investi-
gate.40 
2. Sentencing Guidelines 
Sentencing guidelines are contained in Part 7 of the Rome 
Statute, with applicable penalties and the determination of 
sentences addressed in Articles 77 and 78, respectively.41 Ac-
cording to Article 77, a person convicted of an Article 5 crime 
may face “[i]mprisonment for a specified number of years which 
may not exceed a maximum of 30 years” or “[a] term of life im-
prisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime 
and the individual circumstances . . . .”42 This is not “an elabo-
rate or specific set of sentencing guidelines [but] rather . . . a 
vague general description of potential punishments.”43 
Article 78 continues with guidelines for determining the sen-
tence, such as in the sentencing of a person convicted of more 
than one crime. As specified in Article 78(3), 
																																																																																																																												
 40. Triponel & Pearson, supra note 7, at 67–72; see also About the Court, 
supra note 2. 
 41. Id. art. 77–78. This Note will not explore the penalty provisions of the 
Rome Statute that refer to fines and forfeiture in Article 77(2)(a), and the 
establishment of a trust fund by Article 79. Id. arts. 77, 79. For additional 
information on these provisions and the Victim’s Trust Fund, see Linda M. 
Keller, Seeking Justice at the International Criminal Court: Victims’ Repara-
tions, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 189 (2007); see also Peter G. Fischer, The Vic-
tims’ Trust Fund of the International Criminal Court—Formation of a Func-
tional Reparations Scheme, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 187 (2003), for an analysis 
of the history of victim’s rights and policy considerations for the ICC Victims’ 
Trust Fund. 
 42. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 77. Additionally, this sentencing 
guideline is somewhat reiterated in Article 78(1), stating, “[i]n determining 
the sentence, the Court shall, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, take into account such factors as the gravity of the crime and the 
individual circumstances of the convicted person.” Id. art. 78(1). In the ICC 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 145(3) additionally states that “life 
imprisonment may be imposed when justified by the extreme gravity of the 
crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person, as evidenced 
by the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances.” Int’l Criminal 
Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, at 55, Official Records No. ICC-
ASP/1/3 (2002), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/official%20journal/Docu
ments/RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf [hereinafter Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence]. 
 43. Dubinsky, supra note 11, at 617. 
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[T]he Court shall pronounce a sentence for each crime and a 
joint sentence specifying the total period of imprisonment. 
This period shall be no less than the highest individual sen-
tence pronounced and shall not exceed 30 years imprisonment 
or a sentence of life imprisonment in conformity with article     
77 . . . .44 
Under Article 78(2), the Court must deduct from the sentence 
any previous time spent in detention in accordance with an or-
der of the Court, and may also deduct any time spent in deten-
tion in connection with the crime.45 
Article 78(1) requires that in its sentencing procedures, the 
ICC refer to the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which 
set forth a wide-range of circumstances that the Court must 
also consider.46 First, Article 78(1) requires that the “gravity of 
the crime and individual circumstances of the convicted per-
son” be weighed into the sentencing decision.47 Additionally, 
Rule 145 proscribes a non-exhaustive list of mitigating and ag-
gravating circumstances that must be balanced.48 Mitigating 
circumstances include, but are not limited to, “diminished men-
tal capacity,” duress, or the “person’s conduct after the act.”49 
Alternatively, aggravating circumstances may include, but are 
not limited to, prior criminal convictions, abuse of power, par-
ticularly defenseless victims, “particular cruelty,” and “any mo-
tive involving discrimination.”50 The standard of proof for such 
circumstances is not established in the Rome Statute or the 
																																																																																																																												
 44. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(3). 
 45. Id. art. 78(2). 
 46. Id. art. 78(1). 
 47. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 42. The Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence provide additional considerations beyond the Rome Stat-
ute. For example, according to Rule 145(1)(c), 
In addition to the factors mentioned in article 78, paragraph 1, give 
consideration, inter alia, to the extent of the damage caused, in par-
ticular the harm caused to the victims and their families, the nature 
of the unlawful behaviour and the means employed to execute the 
crime; the degree of participation of the convicted person; the degree 
of intent; the circumstances of manner, time and location; and the 
age, education, social and economic condition of the convicted person. 
Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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Rules of Procedure and Evidence, leaving such discretion to the 
ICC.51 The ICC has currently set the standard of proof for ag-
gravating circumstances as proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
whereas mitigating circumstances are determined by the bal-
ancing of probabilities,52 also known as preponderance of the 
evidence.53 Overall, the Rome Statute provides the foundation 
for the ICC and helps states understand what types of conflicts 
																																																																																																																												
 51. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver 
the Decision, 4 (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1440143.pdf. 
 52. It is crucially important to understand the difference in the standards 
of proof that the ICC has instituted for aggravating and mitigating factors. 
Id. First, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard of proof, 
and has been viewed by the U.S. Supreme Court as “designed to exclude as 
nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.” Etan Mark & 
Monica F. Rossbach, Que Rico? Discarding the Fallacy That Florida Rico and 
Federal Rico Are Identical, 86 FLA. B.J. 10, 12 (Jan. 2012) (citing Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982)). In contrast, balancing of the probabilities, 
also known as the preponderance of the evidence, has been recognized as in-
dicating “society’s ‘minimal concern with the outcome.’” Id. In other words, 
whereas proof beyond a reasonable doubt entails overwhelming evidence, 
balancing of the probabilities only requires “51%” likelihood, or that “more 
evidence supports the finding than contradicts it.” Stephen Wilkinson, 
Standards of Proof in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Fact-
Finding and Inquiry Missions, GENEVA ACAD., available at 
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/Standards%20of%20proo%20report.pdf. 
If the ICC wanted to avoid requiring too much proof for aggravating factors, 
they could have elected for a middle standard of proof such as “clear and con-
vincing evidence.” Id. The burden for clear and convincing evidence requires 
“very solid support,” which is around a “60%” likelihood that the evidence 
“supports the finding.” Id. In choosing the standard of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt for aggravating circumstances, and balancing of the probabilities 
for mitigating circumstances, the ICC chose standards of proof that were as 
far apart on the spectrum as possible. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver the Decision, at 4. Hence, the ICC made it 
very easy for mitigating circumstances to lessen a sentence, and very difficult 
for aggravating circumstances to increase the sentence. Id. 
 53. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver 
the Decision, at 4. Based on the Rome Statute, the only way a sentence would 
go beyond thirty years is if there were aggravating circumstances. See Rome 
Statute, supra note 6, art. 77. However, aggravating circumstances cannot be 
factors already considered in the crime itself that must also be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hear-
ing to Deliver the Decision, at 4. It is difficult to hypothesize where an “ag-
gravating factor” would be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not be 
charged as a crime itself. This is further analyzed in Part III of this Note. 
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may fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction, as well as the factors 
that are relevant to its sentencing decisions. 
C. The First Sentencing: The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo 
1. Background on Thomas “Lubanga” Dyilo 
The first ever trial and sentence by the ICC was related to 
Lubanga’s leadership role in the Forces Patriotiques pour la 
Liberation du Congo (“FPLC”), a military wing of the Union of 
Congolese Patriots (also known as Union des Patriotes Congo-
lais, or “UPC”) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(“DRC”).54 Lubanga’s abuse of his UPC leadership role would 
ultimately lead him to face charges and a conviction for the 
criminal acts he committed in the DRC.55 
The DRC, formerly known as Zaire, is a country known for its 
rich mineral wealth.56 The natural resources of the DRC, and 
the wars in neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, have often 
caused the DRC to be plagued by conflict.57 Specifically in 1996, 
and again in 1998, the DRC was invaded by neighboring 
Rwanda and Uganda; these nations claimed to be fighting 
against their own rebels who had taken refuge in the DRC.58 
The conflict intensified in 2000 when local interethnic conflicts 
began to brew within the wider context of the DRC war.59 
Interethnic conflicts increased between the Hema and Lendu 
																																																																																																																												
 54. Mazurek, supra note 15, at 540–46. 
 55. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Hearing, 
1–7, 12 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1380068.pdf. 
 56. Mazurek, supra note 15, at 540. 
 57. Id. at 540–41. 
 58. Timothy B. Reid, Killing Them Softly: Has Foreign Aid to Rwanda and 
Uganda Contributed to the Humanitarian Tragedy in the DRC?, 1 AFR. POL’Y 
J. 74, 74–75 (2006). From the time of that first invasion and until 2004, 
fighting continued between the DRC and Rwanda, leaving an estimated 3.8 
million people dead. Id. at 77. 
 59. Mark A. Drumbl, International Decision: Prosecutor v. Thomas Luban-
ga Dyilo: International Criminal Court Decision Confirming War Crimes 
Charges for Conscripting, Enlisting, and Using Child Soldiers, 101 A.J.I.L. 
841, 842 (2007). 
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peoples over natural resources, land use, and arms smuggling 
within the Ituri region of the DRC.60 
The UPC was created on September 15, 2000 for the purpose 
of establishing and maintaining political and military control 
over Ituri.61 The UPC quickly became an ethnic Hema militia 
and Lubanga took a primary role in the “common plan to build 
[a Hema] army.”62 Throughout the Ituri conflict, armed groups, 
including Lubanga’s, often targeted civilians and participated 
in “widespread killings, torture, and rape.” 63  “Thousands of 
children, some as young as seven were recruited by all sides 
and used as fighters.”64 As leader of the UPC, Lubanga recruit-
ed child soldiers and would go to people’s homes “ask[ing] for 
cash, a cow, or for a child to fight for his rebel army.”65 “In 
2003, at the height of the DRC armed conflict as many as 
‘30,000 boys and girls’ were conscripted into service.”66 Overall, 
an estimated 60,000 people were killed in the Ituri conflict, 
many of whom were child soldiers.67 
On April 11, 2002, the DRC became a state party to the ICC, 
and therefore subject to its jurisdiction.68 In March 2004, Jo-
seph Kabila, president of the DRC, referred the situation in 
Ituri to the ICC Prosecutor, asking him to further investigate 
the conflict. 69  The ICC Prosecutor’s investigation led to the 
																																																																																																																												
 60. CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008—Congo, 
Democratic Republic of the (May 20, 2008), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/486cb0f5c.html. 
 61. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Hearing, 
5 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1380068.pdf. 
 62. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver 
the Decision, at 5. 
 63. DR Congo: Q&A on the First Verdict at the International Criminal 
Court, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 29, 2012), 
www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/29/dr-congo-qa-first-verdict-international-
criminal-court. 
 64. Id. 
 65. DR Congo Warlord Thomas Lubanga Sentenced to 14 Years, BBC 
NEWS (July 12, 2010), www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18779726. 
 66. Mazurek, supra note 15, at 541. 
 67. Id.; DR Congo: Q&A on the First Verdict at the International Criminal 
Court, supra note 63. 
 68. About the Court, supra note 2. 
 69. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Hearing, 
2 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1380068.pdf. 
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March 2006 arrest of Lubanga.70 Lubanga remained impris-
oned from the time of his initial arrest through the duration of 
his trial.71 Pretrial hearings began soon after his arrest, and on 
January 29, 2007, the judges confirmed the charges against 
Lubanga.72 Lubanga was charged as the co-perpetrator of the 
Ituri conflict for “enlisting and conscripting children under the 
age of fifteen years … and using [the children] to [actively par-
ticipate] in hostilities.”73 
Lubanga’s trial took place over the course of several years, 
with opening statements given on January 26, 2009 and closing 
statements given on August 25–26, 2011.74 There were several 
delays prior to and during the trial, including those caused by 
two stay of proceedings orders, as well as an adjournment for 
an interlocutory appeal.75 Finally on March 14, 2012, Lubanga 
was found guilty of “the war crimes of enlisting and conscript-
ing children under the age of fifteen years and using them to 
participate actively in hostilities in the DRC between Septem-
ber 2002 and August 2003.”76 On July 10, 2012 the ICC held its 
first sentencing hearing, and Lubanga was sentenced to four-
teen years imprisonment.77 
2. The Sentencing of Lubanga 
The ICC was founded on the premise that “[t]he most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole 
																																																																																																																												
 70. Lubanga Case, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=drctimelinelubanga (last visited Aug. 22, 2013). 
The DRC’s ratification of the Rome Statute and its inability to prosecute 
Lubanga as shown by its referral to the ICC Prosecutor were the necessary 
preconditions to grant the ICC jurisdiction. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Wairagala Wakabi, Timeline: Lubanga’s War Crimes Trial at the ICC, 
LUBANGA TRIAL AT THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT (Sept. 14, 2010), 
http://www.lubangatrial.org/2010/09/14/timeline-lubanga’s-war-crimes-trial-
at-the-icc/. On March 17, 2006, Lubanga made his first appearance before the 
Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC. Id. 
 73. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Hearing, 
at 1. 
 74. Id. at 3. 
 75. Id. at 2–3. 
 76. Id. at 12. 
 77. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver 
the Decision, 12 (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1440143.pdf. 
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must not go unpunished.”78 The Court cited to this at Luban-
ga’s sentencing, and attempted to make clear that it was taking 
this important background principle into account.79 In arriving 
at its sentence for Lubanga, the Court specifically considered 
the provisions of Articles 77 and 78 of the Rome Statute, as 
well as Rule 145 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.80 
The Court applied and balanced the factors from Article 78 
and Rule 145, which together mention the “gravity of the crime 
and the individual circumstances,” as well as “mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances.”81 First, the Court considered the 
gravity of Lubanga’s crime, finding it to be “very serious” and 
“affect[ing] the community as whole.”82 This was exacerbated 
by the element of “compulsion”83 in the crime of conscripting.84 
Next, special attention was given to the vulnerability of the 
children involved as compared to the general population, rec-
ognizing that children must be afforded “particular protec-
tion.”85 For example, the physical well-being of children was 
placed at risk of fatal and nonfatal injuries from the violence, 
and the children may continue to suffer serious trauma to their 
psychological well-being.86 Although the exact number of chil-
dren involved in the conflict could not be identified, the Court 
determined that the use of children was “widespread.”87 The 
																																																																																																																												
 78. Id. (quoting Rome Statute, supra note 6, pmbl.). 
 79. See id. at 1. 
 80. Id. at 4–8. 
 81. Id. at 2; Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78. 
 82. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver 
the Decision, at 4; Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78. 
 83. Based on the long-accepted doctrine of international human rights law, 
it is not necessary to show the element of compulsion in proving the crime of 
conscription. Christie Nicoson, Lisa Dailey & Rachel Hall, The International 
Criminal Court, WORLD WITHOUT GENOCIDE, worldwithoutgeno-
cide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/icc (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). Therefore, 
showing this element only worsens or further contributes to the findings 
against the defendant. 
 84. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver 
the Decision, at 4. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 5. 
 87. Id. It is also important to note that in the circumstances of this case, 
the Court states the following should be considered as part of the gravity of 
the crime: 
[T]he extent of the damage caused, and in particular the harm 
caused to the victims and their families, the nature of the unlawful 
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Court also recognized that Lubanga is “an intelligent and well-
educated individual, who would have understood the serious-
ness of the crimes of which he has been found guilty.”88 Alt-
hough a relevant factor, this was not considered an “aggravat-
ing” circumstance because factors considered within the gravity 
of the crime cannot be counted twice or additionally considered 
to be an aggravating circumstance.89 
In Lubanga’s case, several possible aggravating circumstanc-
es were considered, including the punishment inflicted among 
child soldiers and instances of sexual violence. 90  Although 
Lubanga was not specifically charged with these crimes, the 
ICC Prosecutor was still able to put them forth as aggravating 
circumstances.91 However, the Court was unable to take such 
circumstances into account because the ICC Prosecutor could 
not prove them beyond a reasonable doubt—the Court-
established standard of proof for aggravating circumstances.92 
There were, however, mitigating factors that the ICC found to 
be adequate under the Court-established standard of proof of 
balancing the probabilities. 93  Mitigating factors included 
Lubanga’s “respectful and co-operative [nature] throughout the 
proceedings,” even when placed “under considerable unwar-
ranted pressure by the conduct of the prosecution.”94 
																																																																																																																												
behavior and the means employed to execute the crime; the degree of 
participation of the convicted person; the degree of intent; the cir-
cumstances of manner; time and location; and the age, education, so-
cial and economic condition of the convicted person. 
Id. Specifically, in the case of Lubanga, the Court later notes that it has 
“borne in mind the widespread recruitment and the significant use of child 
soldiers during the time-frame of the charges; the position of authority held 
by Mr. Lubanga within the UPC/FPLC and his essential contribution to the 
common plan that resulted, in the ordinary course of events . . . .” Id. at 10. 
 88. Id. at 6. 
 89. Id. at 8. As an additional example, the Court mentions that age is al-
ready considered in evaluating both the gravity of the crime and the individ-
ual and cannot be considered additionally as an aggravating factor. Id. 
 90. Id. at 7. 
 91. Id. at 4. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 9. The Court lists all of the “particularly onerous circumstances,” 
that Lubanga faced during his trial proceedings. Id. It is unclear if the Court 
viewed this as one mitigating factor or several mitigating factors. Id. 
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In accordance with Article 78(3), the Court announced a sen-
tence for each crime Lubanga was found guilty of and a “joint 
sentence specifying the total period of imprisonment.”95 Luban-
ga was sentenced to thirteen years’ imprisonment for conscript-
ing children under the age of fifteen to join the UPC, twelve 
years imprisonment for enlisting children under the age of fif-
teen to join the UPC, and fourteen years’ imprisonment for us-
ing children under the age of fifteen to participate actively in 
hostilities.96 However, despite the twelve- to fourteen-year sen-
tences accompanying each crime, the majority97 of the Court 
sentenced Lubanga to a total period of fourteen years impris-
onment.98 Additionally, pursuant to Article 78(2), the Court de-
ducted the six years Lubanga spent in custody since 2006, find-
ing that only eight years would remain on his sentence.99 
II. COMPARATIVE SENTENCING REGIMES AND PENAL THEORIES 
THAT MAY PROVIDE JUSTIFICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
SENTENCING 
A. Overview of Sentencing in the International Criminal Tribu-
nals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
The ICTY and ICTR, two of the most prominent international 
tribunals to precede the ICC, were established to “prosecute 
persons responsible for serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law.” 100  The ICTY addresses widespread human 
																																																																																																																												
 95. Id. at 11; Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(3). 
 96. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver 
the Decision, at 11. 
 97. Id. at 12. Judge Odio Benito wrote a separate and dissenting opinion in 
regards to a particular and discrete issue. Judge Benito believed that Luban-
ga should have been given an overall sentence of fifteen years due to the 
“damage caused to the victims and their families, particularly as a result of 
the harsh punishments and sexual violence suffered by the victims of these 
crimes pursuant to Rule 145(1)(c) of the Rules.” Id. The issue of considering 
sexual violence as an aggravating circumstance is explored in Part II.B.1. of 
this Note. 
 98. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 194. 
 99. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver 
the Decision, at 12. 
 100. Clark, supra note 7, at 1687 (quoting Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 1, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1602; Statute of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 1, May 
25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192). 
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rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia since 1991, including 
violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and violations of 
the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against hu-
manity.101 The ICTR assumes jurisdiction over criminal mat-
ters, specifically genocide and violations of international hu-
manitarian law that occurred in Rwanda and neighboring 
states in 1994.102 
The two tribunals are structured similarly to one another; 
they often issue a joint or global sentence when there are mul-
tiple convictions, or they issue separate sentences that are 
served concurrently.103 The “gravity of the offence,” the indi-
vidual’s circumstances, and aggravating and mitigating factors 
are all considered in sentencing.104 The ICTY and ICTR also 
provide for recourse to the general sentencing practices of the 
“former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, respectively.”105 In reaching 
a “suitable” sentence, the ICTY and ICTR judges are given 
what others have labeled as “remarkably wide” or “unfettered 
discretion to evaluate the facts and attendant circumstanc-
es.”106 However, such unfettered discretion and the resulting 
sentences are not without criticism. 
Both the ICTY and ICTR have been criticized for several rea-
sons, reasons which often play a role in the resulting nonuni-
form sentences for similar offenders.107 One criticism is the lack 
of explanation for the prescribed term of years, resulting in 
sentences that lose effectiveness and legitimacy.108 A widely 
cited example in the ICTY includes the convictions of Generals 
																																																																																																																												
 101. Mark D. Kielsgard, War on the International Criminal Court, 8 N.Y. 
CITY L. REV. 1, 4 (2005). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Clark, supra note 7, at 1688. 
 104. Id. at 1689. 
 105. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 199. 
 106. Clark, supra note 7, at 1689; Drumbl, supra note 7, at 553. “The ‘unfet-
tered discretion’ to sentence delegated to international judges inexorably 
leads to a broad range of actual sentences.” Id. at 558. 
 107. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 108. Clark, supra note 7, at 1689–94. Legitimacy largely depended on con-
sistency in punishment, because consistency in exchange reflects the “notion 
of equal justice.” Id. at 1689. Global sentences may contribute to a lack of 
legitimacy because “[t]he practice of issuing a single, global sentence for mul-
tiple crimes makes it difficult to demonstrate with precision the extent to 
which similar defendants receive different penalties for similar crimes.” Id. at 
1692. 
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Tihomir Blaskic and Dario Kordic.109 Although both convictions 
were very similar in nature and included the “crimes against 
humanity of persecution, murder, and inhumane acts,” Blaskic 
was sentenced to forty-five years, and “Kordic to only twenty-
five years.”110 Additionally, despite the gravity of the crimes in 
the former Yugoslavia, only one of the ICTY’s sixty-two convic-
tions has resulted in a life sentence.111 The ICTY and ICTR 
have also been criticized as giving insufficient weight to miti-
gating and aggravating factors, and sentences in both tribunals 
have been revised for this reason.112 Andrew N. Keller, author 
of Punishment for Violations of International Criminal Law: An 
Analysis Of Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR, critiques that 
“the Trial Chambers [have] full discretion to consider any other 
aggravating and mitigating circumstance, and to give ‘due 
weight’ to those factors in the determination of an appropriate 
punishment . . . perhaps [the discretion is] too broad and 
should be limited by general sentencing guidelines.”113 
Finally, although the reasons for the establishment of these 
tribunals are clear, the tribunals’ justifications for punishment 
are not. In the case of the ICTY, “[t]he Security Council argued 
in a resolution establishing the tribunal that its purpose would 
be to bring to justice persons who are responsible for the crimes 
as well as to deter and to contribute to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace.”114 However, not only is the statutory 
language silent as to the penal theories, but the judicial deci-
sions are also inconsistent. An analysis of ICTY judgments 
from the years 2000 to 2005 reveals that there are “judgments 
that cite retribution as the ‘primary objective’ and deterrence 
as a ‘further hope,’ warning deterrence ‘should not be given un-
due prominence,’ and judgments that flatly state ‘deterrence 
																																																																																																																												
 109. See id. at 1692. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. The lack of life sentences should be a particularly alarming prece-
dent to the ICC, especially considering that both the ICTY and the ICC were 
established for the unique purpose of dealing with criminals who have violat-
ed some of the most serious international crimes and/or fundamental human 
rights. 
 112. See id. at 1693–94. 
 113. Keller, supra note 7, at 57. 
 114. Christoph J.M. Safferling, The Justification of Punishment in Interna-
tional Criminal Law, 4 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 126, 146 (1999). 
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probably is the most important factor in the assessment of ap-
propriate sentences.’”115 
Although the ICTY and ICTR clearly highlight some of the 
criticisms the ICC may face, in order to find a sentencing ra-
tionale in the international context, it may be best to look at 
attempts to justify domestic punishment.116 
B. The United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a 
Roadmap for Sentencing 
Sentencing regimes pose a challenge for most nations, and it 
is not surprising that the ICC may struggle in its early years to 
reach a proper balance, even with the precedent and criticisms 
of the ICTY and ICTR as guidance. The United States Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines also serve as an example of how difficult 
it may be to limit judicial discretion in sentencing. However, a 
U.S. federal statute, 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), provides a helpful ref-
erence.117 Specifically, 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) lists several factors a 
court should use to determine a “reasonable” sentence.118 These 
factors, in turn, provide a roadmap for rectifying the shortcom-
ings of the ICC. 
Up until the 1970s, federal sentencing in the United States 
was discretionary and granted judges an enormous amount of 
authority in crafting sentences. 119  The Federal Sentencing 
																																																																																																																												
 115. Drumbl, supra note 7, at 561. As discussed throughout this Note, the 
issue is not that the ICC, like the ICTY and ICTR, does not speak clearly to 
one theory of punishment. The issue is, however, when statutory guidelines 
of the ICC do not satisfy or serve any justification of punishment. 
 116. See Safferling, supra note 114, at 128 (discussing domestic theories of 
punishment and stating, “before we try to find a rationale for sentencing in 
international criminal law, we want to look at attempts to justify domestic 
punishment”). 
 117. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2006). 
 118. Id.; see also Christine DeMaso, Advisory Sentencing and the Federali-
zation of Crime: Should Federal Sentencing Judges Consider the Disparity 
Between State and Federal Sentences Under Booker?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
2095, 2108 (2006) (noting “the [Supreme] Court corrected this constitutional 
defect by declaring the Guidelines advisory and instructing appellate courts 
to review sentences for ‘reasonableness’”). 
 119. See Rosemary T. Cakmis, The Role of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines in the Wake of United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan, 56 
MERCER L. REV. 1131, 1133 (2005). 
For almost a century, until the federal sentencing guidelines went 
into effect in 1986, federal judges wielded broad discretion under an 
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Guidelines were enacted in 1987 as a means to eliminate dis-
parate criminal sentences.120 Although the mandatory guide-
lines reduced disparity, they did not always provide for a “fit-
ting” punishment,121  and in 2005 the role of the guidelines 
sharply changed. In United States v. Booker, the sentencing 
guidelines were rendered advisory in nature, leaving sentenc-
ing to the district courts’ discretion and largely guided by the 
factors contained within 18 U.S.C. §3553(a).122 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(1), the “nature and circum-
stances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant” must be considered. 123  Additionally, 18 U.S.C. 
§3553(a)(2) is especially significant as it shows the importance 
placed on several penal theories by the United States in federal 
sentences. The section provides reference to the theories of ret-
ribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. 124  Both 18 U.S.C. 
																																																																																																																												
indeterminate sentencing system, whereby federal judges could im-
pose any sentence upon criminal defendants from probation up to 
and including the statutory maximum as set forth in the United 
States Code. 
Id. 
 120. Ramon E. Javier, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Need to Re-
store “The Balance,” 9 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 179, 180 (1994). The Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines were initially mandatory and binding. Id. 
 121. There were several criticisms during the era of binding Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines. For example, under a three-strikes policy that was initi-
ated, repeat offenders would face life imprisonment on their third offense and 
it was not necessary that all offenses were violent felonies. See Nkechi Taifa, 
“Three-Strikes-and-You’re-Out”—Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third 
Time Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 717, 719 (1995). 
 122. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005); DeMaso, supra note 
118, at 2108. In other words, Booker “returns to judges their traditional au-
thority to craft an individualized sentence for the defendant standing before 
them and it allows them to consider facts outside of the guidelines.” Id. 
 123. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2006). The ICC, as governed by the Rome Statute, 
does this by considering the gravity of the crime and the individual circum-
stances. However, this still leaves open the issue of how mitigating and ag-
gravating circumstances are additionally considered and often unequally 
weighed into the sentencing equation. This issue is discussed in Part III of 
this Note. 
 124. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2) (2006). 
(a) Factors To Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence—The court 
shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to 
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsec-
tion. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be im-
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§3553(3) and (4) refer to the kind of sentences available, and 
the associated sentencing ranges.125 Lastly, 18 U.S.C. §3553(6) 
refers to “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar conduct.”126 However, the ICC has only one 
determinate guideline: that the sentence does not exceed thirty 
years unless justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and 
the individual circumstances of the convicted person.127 
C. Theories of Punishment in Domestic Criminal Justice Sys-
tems 
There are several theories of punishment that are incorpo-
rated into sentencing guidelines in states throughout the 
world, including, but not limited to, the United States, Singa-
pore, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Finland, Sweden, and Germa-
ny.128 As referenced in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), the most prominent 
theories include retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.129 
																																																																																																																												
posed, shall consider . . . 2) the need for the sentence imposed—(A) to 
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, 
and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford ade-
quate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant 
with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or oth-
er correctional treatment in the most effective manner. 
Id. 
 125. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2006). Other than the thirty-year limitation, the 
Rome Statute does not set forth any sentencing ranges for the international 
crimes it governs. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(3). 
 126. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2006). The U.S. federal statute contains two addi-
tional provisions not discussed in this Note. Section (a)(7) states the need to 
provide restitution to any victims of the offense. Id. Section (a)(5) discusses 
any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id. 
 127. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(3). 
 128. See 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2006); Tan Yock Lin, Public Interest in Sen-
tencing: Deterrence or Desert or Anything Else?, 2009 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 25 
(2009); Kelly Busche & W. David Walls, Proportional Justice Versus Efficient 
Deterrence in Hong Kong Criminal Sentencing, 25 HONG KONG L.J. 180 
(1995); The Rationales and Goals of Sentencing, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/s/sentencing-
policy-and-guidance-a-discussion-paper/3.-the-rationales-and-goals-of-
sentencing (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (N.Z.) [hereinafter New Zealand Sen-
tencing Paper]; Edward J. Eberle, The Method and Role of Comparative Law, 
8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 451, 484–85 (2009). 
 129. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2006). 
542 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:1 
Another theory often considered in the international context is 
restorative justice.130 The ICC, however, refuses to refer to any 
punishment theories in its decisions and sentencing guide-
lines.131 Additionally, the ICC and the Rome Statute have nev-
er purported to ascribe to any of these theories specifically.132 
Rather, the ICC merely looks at the gravity of the crime and 
the individual circumstances.133 Notwithstanding, punishment 
theories, as seen through the example of several states, provide 
important considerations in sentencing and should serve as 
underlying justifications for imposing individual criminal lia-
bility on an international scale.134 Furthermore, they highlight 
the shortcomings of the Rome Statute as demonstrated by the 
Lubanga trial. 
Similar to the United States, criminal statutes in Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and New Zealand recognize the several theories of 
punishment to include retribution, deterrence, and rehabilita-
tion.135 The theory of retribution specifically focuses on the in-
																																																																																																																												
 130. See Jessica Leinwand, Punishing Horrific Crime: Reconciling Interna-
tional Prosecution with National Sentencing Practices, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 799, 809–10 (2009). 
 131. See generally Drumbl, supra note 7, at 558 (stating that “international 
criminal tribunals . . . are silent as to the penological purpose of the sentenc-
es imposed”). See also David Bosco, The International Criminal Court and 
Crime Prevention: Byproduct or Conscious Goal?, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 163, 
194 (2011). 
The guidelines for sentencing at the ICC are elaborated in the Rule 
of Procedure and Evidence, but they do not include any reference to 
the deterrence function or indeed to any of the traditional purposes 
of punishment . . . a number of aggravating and mitigating condi-
tions are also listed, but none of them relate specifically to preven-
tion or deterrence. 
Id. 
 132. See supra text accompanying note 131. 
 133. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(1). 
 134. See sources cited supra note 128. 
 135. See Lin, supra note 128, at 26 (discussing the Singapore case, R. v. 
Sargeant, and stating “there are four (classical) sentencing goals or aims: 
retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation”); Busche & Walls, su-
pra note 128, at 180 (discussing the balancing of different penal theories and 
stating that “[l]egal scholars suggest that the criminal justice system has 
several aims: retribution, reformation, incapacitation, individual deterrence, 
and general deterrence. These aims can be thought of as combining consider-
ations of justice relating to past actions and considerations of deterrence of 
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dividual offender, and the punishment is set forth simply as 
commensurate with what the criminal deserves. 136  As ex-
pressed by the courts in New Zealand, “the judicial obligation is 
to ensure that the punishment [the courts] impose in the name 
of the community is itself a civilized reaction, determined not 
on impulse or emotion but in terms of justice and delibera-
tions.”137 Retribution is also considered to be “proportional jus-
tice,” where the punishment increases directly with the seri-
ousness of the crime.138 In Finland, for example, the penal code 
states, “punishment shall be measured so that it is in just pro-
portion to the damage and the danger caused by the offence 
and to the guilt of the offender manifested in the offence.”139 
The 1989 Swedish Criminal Code has a similar statement, 
where the key factors considered for punishment include “the 
harm, offence or risk which the conduct involved, what the ac-
cused realized or should have realized about it, and the inten-
tion and motives of the accused.”140 Ultimately, the moral cul-
pability of the offender places the duty to punish on society.141 
The punishment should fit the crime, and the sentence should 
be comparable to the crime.142 Therefore, retributive rationales 
are backward-looking and result in a moral balance being recti-
fied.143 
The theories of deterrence and rehabilitation both fall within 
the wider category of utilitarian punishment theories.144 Utili-
tarianism, as compared to retribution, focuses on the ultimate 
betterment of society, and in the case of general deterrence, the 
																																																																																																																												
crime by control of future criminal behavior”) (internal citations omitted); see 
generally New Zealand Sentencing Paper, supra note 128. 
 136. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 38–46 (5th 
ed. 2007). 
 137. New Zealand Sentencing Paper, supra note 128. 
 138. Ryan Florio, The [Capital] Punishment Fits the Crime: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Death Penalty and Proportionality in the United States of 
America and the People’s Republic of China, 16 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 43, 51–52 (2008). 
 139. New Zealand Sentencing Paper, supra note 128. 
 140. Id. (quoting A. ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 83 (1st 
ed. 1992)). 
 141. DRESSLER, supra note 136, at 38–46. 
 142. Id.; Leinwand, supra note 130, at 804. 
 143. See Dubinsky, supra note 11, at 618. 
 144. DRESSLER, supra note 136, at 33–38. Prevention is often considered 
with deterrence and rehabilitation under utilitarianism. Id. 
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offender becomes part of the means to reach a “greater social 
good.”145 The purpose of general deterrence is to dissuade oth-
ers from such acts in the future.146 The New Zealand courts 
have also recognized the use of imprisonment as a general de-
terrent, stating that “there can be no time when it is more nec-
essary for the court to use their sentencing powers firmly in the 
hope of deterrence than at the early stage of the growth of a 
new social evil.”147 It is important to note, however, that the 
effectiveness of deterrence often depends on a potential offend-
er’s knowledge as to the likelihood of being caught and convict-
ed, and on the likely penalty.148 
Rehabilitation may also be considered, in the hopes of helping 
and reforming those who have committed crimes.149 In many 
European countries, for example, the focus is on rehabilitation 
so that convicted criminals can reenter society and resume a 
normal life.150 For this reason, life imprisonment is rarely im-
posed and the death penalty is not an option.151 The importance 
of re-socialization is seen in a famous German Constitutional 
Court case, often referred to as “Lebach.”152 In that case, the 
court granted an injunction so that a documentary on a con-
victed criminal could not be released after the offender had 
																																																																																																																												
 145. New Zealand Sentencing Paper, supra note 128. 
 146. Deterrence is usually divided into general and individual deterrence. 
Id. “If individual deterrence is the goal, then penalties are escalated once a 
person starts reoffending. The sentencing judge could, for example, choose to 
make an example of a persistent burglar by imprisoning him or her for the 
maximum term, even if the current offense is relatively minor.” Id. This can 
also be analogized to the United States three-strikes policy. See Taifa, supra 
note 121. However, in the international context this will likely be less rele-
vant as the ICC should not be dealing with repeat offenders for crime of the 
most serious concern to the international community. 
 147. New Zealand Sentencing Paper, supra note 128. 
 148. Id. It is important to note that although retribution and utilitarian 
theories of punishment have very different means of reaching a just punish-
ment, this does not necessarily mean they will result in different ends. Hypo-
thetically, a sentence of forty years for murder may be considered proportion-
al to the crime and it may also be sufficient to deter others from committing a 
similar crime. 
 149. DRESSLER, supra note 136, at 33–45. 
 150. Eberle, supra note 128, at 484–85. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 485. Eberle, the author, also explains this case as an example of 
a situation where the felon’s healthy re-entry into society was more im-
portant than an accurate depiction of his role in a notorious crime. Id. 
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served his prison sentence.153 In the judgment, the court gave 
priority to protection of personality over freedom of expression 
or information, and found the right to re-socialization to be an 
integral part of the offender’s constitutionally guaranteed 
rights.154 Ultimately, utilitarian rationales are forward-looking, 
hoping to both deter and rehabilitate the offender, while gener-
ally deterring society as a whole. 
Finally, restorative justice is often considered on an interna-
tional scale in order to encourage peace building for the na-
tion.155 One definition of restorative justice is the “bringing to-
gether [of] individuals who have been affected by an offense 
and having them agree on how to repair the harm caused by 
the crime.”156 The hope is that restorative justice will result in 
a restoration that both benefits and is agreed upon by the vic-
tims, the offenders, and the affected communities.157 Although 
a newer penal theory with less practical examples, many schol-
ars consider restorative justice an important consideration for 
international courts.158 
Overall, the ICC’s main goal is to end impunity, or exemp-
tion, from punishment. Despite the Rome Statute’s clear 
statement of this goal, the statute fails to provide any penal 
theory, or combination of theories, to justify such punishment. 
It remains unclear if sentences should be driven by a back-
ward- or forward-looking approach, and whether the needs of 
victims, the needs of society as a whole, or the rehabilitation of 
victims should be given primary, if any, importance. The ICTY, 
ICTR, and the U.S. federal sentencing regime provide a com-
parative tool that can be used to show where the ICC has fallen 
short in its sentencing guidelines, and in the sentencing of 
																																																																																																																												
 153. Christine Morgenstern, Judicial Rehabilitation in Germany—The Use 
of Criminal Records and the Removal of Recorded Convictions, 3 EUR. J. 
PROBATION 20, 22 (2011). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Leinwand, supra note 130, at 809–10. 
 156. Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Concep-
tion of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 228 (2003). 
 157. Id. The article provides some examples of restorative justice, such as 
“family group conferencing in Australia and New Zealand, community repar-
ative boards in Vermont, circle sentencing in Canada, and victim-offender 
mediation throughout North America and Europe—all aimed at bringing 
stakeholders together to fashion appropriate resolutions to crime, typically 
through mediated dialogue.” Id. at 229. 
 158. See generally Leinwand, supra note 130; Luna, supra note 156. 
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Lubanga. Furthermore, they highlight how the ICC has failed 
to account for the theories of punishment, which provide im-
portant justifications that could help the ICC to reach its goals. 
III. MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES, MAXIMUM 
SENTENCES, AND GLOBAL SENTENCES ONLY FRUSTRATE THE 
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT THAT THE ICC MAY CONSIDER 
In an attempt to solve the problems and inconsistencies that 
plagued the ICTY and ICTR, the Rome Statute and the ICC 
have made it increasingly difficult to consider any of the penal 
theories. One major concern that was prevalent in both the 
ICTY and ICTR was the unequal weight given to mitigating 
and aggravating circumstances.159 As a consequence, the ICTY 
and ICTR were often criticized as having discretion that was 
too broad, resulting in sentences that lacked uniformity and 
were too far removed from the theories of punishment.160 
With the intention to resolve this problem, or at least to allow 
for more consistent sentences, the Rome Statute set forth the 
thirty-year maximum imprisonment sentence, with a life sen-
tence available only in extreme circumstances.161 However, the 
																																																																																																																												
 159. See sources cited supra note 7. 
 160. See Keller, supra note 7, at 57–74 (discussing that in the use of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances “discretion is perhaps too broad,” and 
“[t]he ICTY and ICTR should reassess certain aspects of their sentencing 
practice with regard to the use of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
the Trial Chambers must refrain from deviating substantially from the prin-
ciples of deterrence and retribution merely because of the existence of miti-
gating factors”); see generally Clark, supra note 7, at 1707–08 (discussing the 
lack of uniformity in Ad Hoc Tribunal’s sentencing, where many times on 
appeal, the Appeals Chamber had to increase or decrease a sentence due to 
the weight that the Trial Chamber had given to both mitigating and aggra-
vating factors. In the ICTY, a two-and-a-half-year sentence was found to be 
“manifestly inadequate,” and in the ICTR, cases on appeal included purport-
ed mitigating factors of relative insignificance). 
 161. See Ines Monica Weinberg de Roca & Christopher M. Rassi, Sentencing 
and Incarceration in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 8–9 (2008). 
According to commentators, the primary goal of sentencing reform in 
the past thirty years has been to eliminate disparity in the punish-
ment of offenders for similar crimes . . . Notably, the ICC has at-
tempted to streamline sentencing practice. Article 77 of the ICC 
Statute allows for the imposition of a term not to exceed thirty years 
or the imposition of a life sentence. In Article 77(1)(b), when ‘justified 
by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances 
of the convicted person.’ 
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provisions of the Rome Statute have not resolved these prob-
lems, but actually created more of them. First, the inconsisten-
cies created by mitigating and aggravating circumstances re-
mains and can be seen by their unequal application in Luban-
ga’s sentence. Second, the thirty-year maximum provision, to-
gether with the use of joint and concurrent sentences, will like-
ly lead to more lenient sentences. 
A. The Problems That Remain from the ICTY and ICTR: Une-
qual Balance of Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances in 
the ICC 
The unequal balancing of mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances that often caused lenient and inconsistent sentencing 
in the ICTY and ICTR are likely to have the same result in the 
ICC as seen through the example of the Lubanga trial.162 As 
discussed in Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: 
The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, Professor Mark Drumbl163 
states: 
No ordering principle is provided as to the relative weight to 
attribute to any of these [aggravating and mitigating] factors. 
Nor is there any explicit guidance as to the weight to accord 
to a factor in sentencing when that same factor already may 
have been considered in establishing the mental element of 
the substantive offense. Consequently, the quantification of 
sentence in individual cases still is effectively left to the exer-
cise of judicial discretion in a manner similar to the ICTY and 
ICTR. Nor does the ICC’s . . . law provide any significant 
guidance regarding the purposes of sentencing.164 
Despite the intent of the drafters of the Rome Statute to 
adopt what they “considered the best rulings and practices of 
earlier courts,” Lubanga’s case demonstrates that Drumbl’s 
																																																																																																																												
Id. 
 162. See generally sources cited supra note 7. 
 163. Professor Mark Drumbl has researched, published, and given numer-
ous lectures in the area of international criminal law, especially relating to 
child soldiers. For more information, see Mark A. Drumbl, WASH. & LEE UNIV. 
SCH. OF LAW, law.wlu.edu/faculty/profiledetail.asp?id=11 (last visited Jan. 12, 
2013). 
 164. Drumbl, supra note 7, at 554 (internal citations omitted). 
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statement is correct and the ICC has fallen victim to the same 
criticism as the ICTY and ICTR.165 
First, the Lubanga Court’s decision to adopt unequal stand-
ards of proof for aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
demonstrates that the Court’s discretion is too broad. At the 
sentencing hearing, the Court stated that “[i]t is for the Cham-
ber to establish the standard of proof for the purposes of sen-
tencing, given the Statute and the Rules do not provide any 
guidance.”166 The Court continues to explain that because the 
aggravating factors established “may have a significant effect 
on the overall length of the sentence []Lubanga will serve, it is 
necessary that they are established to the criminal standard of 
proof, namely ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’”167 Mitigating cir-
cumstances, however, were granted the much lower evidentiary 
standard of being established by a balancing of the probabili-
ties.168 
Not only are these standards now evaluated on far from 
equal footing, but a circular problem is created as aggravating 
circumstances cannot be factors considered within the gravity 
of the crime, and they must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.169 However, if a crime or charge could be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt, then the ICC Prosecutor would have likely 
charged the defendant with that crime.170 For example, the ICC 
Prosecutor did not charge Lubanga with rape and other forms 
of sexual violence as separate or additional crimes. 171  The 
																																																																																																																												
 165. Patricia M. Wald, Sharpening the Cutting Edge of International Hu-
man Rights Law: Unresolved Issues of War Crimes Tribunal, 30 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 15, 27 (2007). 
 166. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver 
the Decision, at 4. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 8. 
 170. Although, in the July 10 Hearing to Deliver the Decision, the Court 
seems to be of the view that the ICC Prosecutor “failed” to charge Lubanga 
with sexual crimes, this still does not alter the problem that arises when ag-
gravating circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 7. 
 171. Id. at 6–7. There are issues that arise with this, as the Court seems to 
blame the ICC Prosecutor for failing to include this as a charged offense and 
then for referring to it throughout trial. Id. However, knowing this was an 
important factor, especially to victims, makes it increasingly unfair that the 
Court did not allow its inclusion and shows that the Court’s discretion was 
too broad. Id. The Court knew this was a factor that was going to be consid-
ered in sentencing, and using “the balancing of probabilities” would have 
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Court was unable to conclude that “sexual violence against the 
children who were recruited was sufficiently widespread to 
mean that it could be characterized as occurring in the ordi-
nary course of the implementation of the common plan for 
which []Lubanga is responsible,” and hence, Lubanga’s role 
could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.172 These fac-
tors, however, still should have been given some consideration 
in sentencing, especially since the purpose of aggravating cir-
cumstances is to give weight to additional negative factors af-
fecting the defendant’s role or crime.173 The Court has ultimate-
ly set a standard of proof that will almost always fail to consid-
er aggravating circumstances.174 In contrast, if the much lower 
standard of proof that applies to mitigating circumstances, bal-
ancing of the probabilities, applied equally to aggravating cir-
cumstances, then Lubanga’s role in sexual crimes would have 
likely qualified as an aggravating circumstance. 
Rather than learning from the inconsistent sentencing that 
plagued the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC’s broad discretion will 
likely lead it down an analogous, nonuniform path where simi-
lar crimes result in a wide range of sentences.175 Furthermore, 
the Court’s broad discretion has resulted in a lenient sentence 
that does not seem to serve the theories of punishment. Luban-
ga was found guilty of conscripting, enlisting, and having chil-
dren under the age of fifteen participate actively in hostilities. 
However, his sentence seems to go against both retributive and 
utilitarian theories, as a high bar has been placed that denies 
																																																																																																																												
made it very likely that this could be considered in Lubanga’s sentencing as 
compared to the standard of proof that was set forth for aggravating circum-
stances. 
 172. Id. at 7. 
 173. Id. at 4. It is also important to note that aggravating, mitigating, and 
individual circumstances, as well as the gravity of the crime, are all factored 
into the sentencing equation. Id. Why the court chose to acknowledge that 
aggravating circumstances have a significant impact on sentencing, but did 
not say mitigating circumstances have an impact, only adds to the confusion 
set forth by the ICC in its first sentencing. See id. As the Court mentions, 
there is nothing in the rules that provides guidance on the standard of proof. 
Id. However, that being said, there is also nothing that gives the Court rea-
son to set different and unequal standards. 
 174. See generally id. at 4. 
 175. See generally Clark, supra note 7, at 1707. This statement follows the 
assumption that the ICC will continue to follow a similar path to that of the 
ICTY and ICTR. 
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consideration of the possible sexual crimes and punishments 
the defendant committed, but allows leniency for the defend-
ant’s respect and cooperation during proceedings. First, under 
the retributive theory, Lubanga’s true moral culpability is not 
considered because aggravating circumstances, such as sexual 
crimes, cannot be factored into sentencing, but mitigating cir-
cumstances can and ultimately allow for leniency.176 Addition-
ally, deterrence is not adequately considered, as Lubanga 
would have no reason to be deterred from participating or tak-
ing a less substantial role in other crimes, so long as they could 
not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. The ICC’s Problematic Provisions of Concurrent Sentences 
and the Thirty-Year Limit 
Additional problems arise as the penalties section of the 
Rome Statute, specifically Article 77, seems unable to serve the 
purposes of most, if not all, theories of punishment. This inade-
quacy can be seen first in the thirty-year maximum sentence 
that the statute implements for almost all penalties.177 Such a 
strict limitation cannot be found in the statutes governing oth-
er international tribunals, such as those of Rwanda or Yugo-
slavia. 
The ICC Prosecutor will almost always be unable to request a 
sentence greater than thirty years.178 This limitation further 
frustrates having punishments that are proportional to the of-
fense.179 It has ultimately been predetermined that no crime 
																																																																																																																												
 176. DRESSLER, supra note 136, at 38–46. As discussed in Part II.A, “true 
moral culpability” speaks to the heart of the theory of retribution. See id. For 
a sentence to reflect the offender’s true moral culpability, it should be propor-
tional. See id. Here, by allowing positive or mitigating factors to decrease the 
sentence but not allowing “negative” or aggravating factors to increase it, the 
resulting sentence is not proportional to the offender’s actions and therefore 
does not reflect the offender’s “true moral culpability.” 
 177. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 77. Part III.A explains why the life 
imprisonment sentence is extremely unlikely because of the additional limit-
ing circumstances that are placed on it by the standards governing aggravat-
ing circumstances. 
 178. See id.; see generally Kevin Jon Heller, A Sentence-Based Theory of 
Complementarity, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85, 113–14 (2012). 
 179. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 81(2)(a). Despite the several contra-
dictions to this goal, including the thirty-year limitation set forth by the 
Rome Statute, the Court states, “pursuant to Article 81(2)(a) of the Statute, 
the Chamber must ensure that the sentence is in proportion to the crime.” 
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will be proportional to a sentence that is greater than thirty 
years but not deserving of life imprisonment.180 Additionally, 
even a thirty-year sentence will be a high bar to overcome, 
since thirty years is the maximum sentence for almost all cas-
es.181 
The problem worsens when the individual and joint sentence 
provisions are considered. As seen in Lubanga’s case, he re-
ceived three sentences of twelve, thirteen, and fourteen years, 
but a joint sentence of only fourteen years for all three crimes 
he was convicted of.182 First, Lubanga could not be sentenced to 
serve these terms consecutively because thirty-nine years is not 
an available sentencing option.183 Second, as stated in Article 
77, the Court was only required to sentence Lubanga to the 
highest of his individual sentences.184 Hence, the Court sen-
																																																																																																																												
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver the 
Decision, 3 (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1440143.pdf 
(emphasis added). 
 180. According to the Rome Statute, there can be no sentence that is greater 
than thirty years, except in extreme situations where a life sentence may be 
imposed. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(3). 
 181. If the Court is already afraid to set a high sentence in its first case, 
and thirty years will almost always be the maximum sentence, the Court may 
be reserving this for the criminals it sees as the worst offenders. However, it 
is unclear who the Court will determine this to be or when this may happen. 
See Kate Kovarovic, Pleading for Justice: The Availability of Plea Bargaining 
as a Method of Alternative Dispute Resolution at the International Criminal 
Court, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 283, 299–300 (2011). In Kovarovic’s article, this 
proposition is additionally supported through the discussion of plea bargains. 
Critics also discount the fact that prosecutors must work within the 
sentencing confines established by the Tribunal. The sentencing 
range of the ICC is “already perceived by some as too low,” as the 
Rome Statute does not provide for the death penalty and only allows 
life imprisonment to be assigned in exceptional circumstances . . . 
The appeal for most defendants in seeking a plea bargain is the hope 
of securing a more lenient sentence. When the sentencing maximum 
is fairly minimal, prosecutors are thus forced to reduce a defendant’s 
sentence even further . . . the problem of leniency stems from the 
Rome Statute itself. 
Id. 
 182. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver 
the Decision, at 11. 
 183. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 77(1)(a). Thirty-nine years exceeds the 
thirty-year limitation. Id. 
 184. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(3). 
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tenced Lubanga to the minimum required by the statute, re-
sulting in his fourteen-year sentence.185 Further, without any 
type of minimum sentence requirement, the ICC could theoret-
ically choose between zero and thirty years.186 By providing a 
minimal explanation to Lubanga’s fourteen-year sentence, it 
appears as though the ICC simply chose an arbitrary number 
that was in the middle of the available range, influenced only 
by a thirty-year limitation, with no mandatory minimum 
weighing in.187 
Setting such a low bar for its first sentence is not unique for 
an international court. The ICTY in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 
one of the first cases ever before the ICTY, experienced a simi-
lar problem.188 The ICTY sentenced Erdemovic to only a five-
year sentence after he pled guilty to killing between ten and 
																																																																																																																												
 185. Id. 
 186. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(3). As discussed above, alt-
hough extreme situations may warrant a life sentence, in all other cases 
there can be no sentence that is greater than thirty years. Id. Hence, the up-
per-limit of a sentence will almost always be thirty years. Id. With no mini-
mum sentence provided for in the Rome Statute, the lowest sentence availa-
ble is theoretically zero years. 
 187. At the sentencing, the Court addressed all the relevant provisions of 
the Rome Statute, as also discussed throughout this Note. See generally Pros-
ecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver the Deci-
sion. For example, the Court explained that there were no aggravating cir-
cumstances as they could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
hence, there were no extreme circumstances warranting a life sentence. Id. at 
10. The Court also reviewed the mitigating circumstances it would take into 
account. Id. at 9. However, other than “taking into account all the factors … 
discussed,” an explanation as to why the term of years was fourteen, as op-
posed to any other available sentence, is not provided in the sentencing tran-
script. Id. at 11. 
 188. Marisa Bassett, Defending International Sentencing: Past Criticism to 
the Promises of the ICC, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2009, at 22, 23. See also 
Dubinsky, supra note 11, at 636, where Dubinsky discusses that the ICC 
must learn from Erdemovic’s trial. 
The purpose of an international court is not to punish crimes such as 
petty theft or common law torts. Instead, cases before such a court 
will involve serious crimes inflicted on populations of people, such as 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. Crimes in front of the ICC 
will involve the systemic rape, torture, and murder of many people. 
Therefore, the ICC will only try the world’s most heinous criminals. 
Because of this, it is unacceptable for people like . . . Drazen Erde-
movic to walk out of a jailhouse alive. 
Id. 
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100 civilian Muslim men.189 The ICTY received major criticism 
for imposing such a low first sentence. 190  However, in the 
ICTY’s sixty-two convictions, it has ultimately imposed much 
higher sentences on many other offenders and has been able to 
overcome the low bar it initially set.191 Unfortunately, due to 
the joint sentence and thirty-year limitations, it will be very 
difficult for the ICC to overcome what many have criticized as a 
very low sentence for its first case.192 
Finally, the provisions of Article 77 fail to satisfy the theories 
of punishment for several reasons. First, based on the theory of 
retribution, the punishment should fit and be comparable to 
the crime.193 However, based on the Lubanga sentencing, it ap-
pears that whether Lubanga committed only the crime deserv-
ing of the fourteen-year sentence, or all three crimes, he only 
deserved a fourteen-year sentence. This punishment seems to 
fit only one of the crimes, rather than all three of them as it 
should.194 Second, it is possible that an offender would be de-
terred from committing a crime based on his or her knowledge 
of the ICC and the fact that he or she may face imprisonment. 
However, once he or she chooses to commit one crime, there 
																																																																																																																												
 189. Dubinsky, supra note 11, at 622–25. 
 190. Bassett, supra note 188, at 23. 
 191. See generally Weinberg de Roca & Rassi, supra note 161. 
 192. See DR Congo Warlord Thomas Lubanga Sentenced to 14 Years, supra 
note 65. 
 193. DRESSLER, supra note 136, at 38–46; Leinwand, supra note 130, at 804. 
 194. The Court rejected the Prosecutor’s argument that there should be a 
consistent baseline of 80% of the statutory maximum for sentencing, which 
would then take into account aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Pros-
ecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver the Deci-
sion, 11 (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1440143.pdf. 
Here, this would be twenty-four years, based on the thirty-year statutory 
guideline, and then properly balanced for other circumstances. See id. The 
Court rejected the Prosecutor’s proposal and stated that one reason the sen-
tence passed was that the sentence “should always be proportionate to the 
crime” and “an automatic starting point—as proposed by the former Prosecu-
tor—that is the same for all offences would tend to undermine that funda-
mental principle.” Id. at 10. However, this argument can be seen as ironic 
considering the joint sentence of fourteen years in the case of Lubanga. Id. at 
4. He was individually sentenced to twelve to fourteen years for each of his 
three crimes but his joint sentence is only fourteen years. Id. By this stand-
ard, it appears that whether one or three crimes was committed, almost the 
same sentence would be given. One may argue that this decision of the Court 
is contrary to the Article 81(2)(a) requirement that sentences should be pro-
portionate to the crime. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 81(2)(a). 
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would be little to deter an offender from committing multiple 
crimes when the resulting sentence remains the same. Finally, 
with Lubanga returning to the DRC in eight years or less, it 
seems unlikely to satisfy the restorative justice theory because 
the affected individuals have lost the opportunity to weigh in 
on the sentence and have had little time to rebuild peace in the 
nation. 
IV. A CHANGE FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS: WHY THE 
NATIONAL DEFERENCE PROVISION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
REMOVED 
In order to better serve the theories of punishment, and pro-
vide additional means of guidance in sentencing, the Rome 
Statute should be amended to provide deference to the laws of 
the nation involved. For example, international criminal justice 
was sought for the crimes committed by Charles Taylor in Sier-
ra Leone.195 Taylor was found guilty by the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) for “crimes against humanity and war 
crimes,” including murder, rape, mutilation of civilians, and 
the use of child soldiers.196 However, in Taylor’s case, the pros-
ecutors requested that he receive eighty years imprisonment, 
and the judge ultimately sentenced the 64-year-old Taylor to 
fifty years. 197  With a fifty-year sentence, Taylor will likely 
spend the rest of his life in prison, whereas Lubanga may re-
turn to the DRC in less than eight years.198 There is one factor 
that may help to explain this discrepancy. Special international 
courts or tribunals like that of the SCSL, and similar to the 
ICTY and ICTR, give deference to laws of the nation involved, 
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especially when considering “penalties” or sentencing.199 The 
Rome Statute, however, contains no such provision.200 
Unlike the SCSL that sentenced Taylor, which is special to 
Sierra Leone, or the ICTY and ICTR, which are special to Yu-
goslavia and Rwanda respectively, the ICC could potentially 
take on cases from 122 different nations.201 Initially, consider-
ing the increasing commitment required to give deference to a 
different nation every time one of its individuals is brought to 
the ICC, it makes sense that the ICC removed such a provision 
from the Rome Statute. When the principles of “complementa-
rity” and “implementation” are considered, however, the justifi-
cations for not giving deference seem to lose support. 
First, the principle of complementarity is unique to the ICC, 
as it allows the ICC to complement the justice system of the 
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nation involved.202 As discussed in Part I,203 the ICC is a court 
of last resort and the nation must be unable or unwilling to 
handle the case before the ICC can gain jurisdiction.204 It is on-
ly after the failure of the nation to prosecute its own criminals, 
and after acquiring proper jurisdiction, that the ICC will step 
in to investigate and prosecute individuals suspected of major 
criminal wrongdoing.205 Second, it is in response to the com-
plementarity principle that “implementation” of the provisions 
of the Rome Statute becomes important.206 In order for a state 
to maintain its sovereignty, and have the ability to prosecute 
its own criminals for international crimes, it must first have 
legislation that provides it with jurisdiction over such 
crimes.207 For example, if a state has signed the Rome Statute 
but does not include “war crimes” in its own penal code or legis-
lation, then the only way war crimes could be prosecuted is by 
the ICC. Therefore, the principle of complementarity is not in 
force, as the ICC would be the only way to prosecute such 
crimes, rather than acting as the court of last resort.208 
For this reason, nations adopting the Rome Statute will at 
least set forth draft legislation providing penalties in their do-
mestic systems for the same crimes which the ICC may prose-
cute. 209  This often includes the crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes, which are offenses prohib-
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ited by the Rome Statute.210 In addition, implementing legisla-
tion sets forth sentencing guidelines for how that nation would 
punish international crimes.211 For example, Senegal is one na-
tion that has ratified the Rome Statute and put implementing 
legislation in force. 212  Several other nations, including the 
DRC, have at least drafted implementing legislation.213 
In drafting implementing legislation, most countries have 
adopted stronger penalties than those in the Rome Statute, and 
few African countries have adopted the specific wording of Ar-
ticle 77, or the thirty-year maximum penalty.214 The DRC is 
one example of a nation with draft legislation that sets forth 
sentencing guidelines very different from Article 77 and its 
thirty-year imprisonment provision.215 For example, Article 25 
of the DRC draft legislation states, “whosoever kills a person 
protected by international humanitarian law during armed in-
ternational or non-international conflict, is sentenced to life 
imprisonment,” and Article 26(1) states, “[p]unishable by a 
criminal sentence of five to twenty years is whosoever takes 
hostage a person protected by international humanitarian 
law.”216 Throughout the DRC draft legislation, this format is 
followed, and varying degrees of crimes are assigned different 
sentences. 217  Additionally, unlike the Rome Statute, many 
crimes are assigned a range, including a minimum sentence.218 
Importantly, and relevant to Lubanga’s sentencing, is that 
the “DRC’s draft legislation has adopted the [Rome] Statute’s 
definition of war crimes and has included the recruitment of 
children under the age of eighteen years as a punishable of-
fense.”219 This is broader than the Rome Statute, where the age 
for penalized enlistment is children under the age of fifteen.220 
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Since Lubanga’s case provides only an estimate for the thou-
sands of soldiers used, it is unclear if this could have impacted 
the ICC’s sentencing.221 Regardless, the DRC’s definition seems 
to reflect a desire for broader, harsher enforcement, and this 
could have been an influential factor in sentencing.222 
If a nation has at least drafted implementing legislation, the 
ICC could then easily give deference to how the nation itself 
would have prosecuted the crime.223 Although deference to na-
tional legislation may not favor uniformity across all states, it 
would instead allow for sentences that better reflect the differ-
ent theories of punishment and are more likely to be respected 
as fair and legitimate by each state.224 First, a minimum sen-
tence increases the effectiveness of deterrence, as potential of-
fenders will more likely be aware of the consequences.225 Sec-
ond, as part of the theory of retribution, the punishment should 
fit the crime and provide a moral balance.226 National legisla-
tion may provide for sentencing ranges, which include mini-
mums and maximums, resulting in proportional punishments 
that better fit the crime.227 Additionally, if a sentence reflects 
the legislation that has been recorded by the state, then the 
desires of the victims and the community are more likely to be 
heard, and the theory of restorative justice is more likely to be 
satisfied.228 
Although it seems that many African nations have adopted 
broader interpretations or recommended higher sentences than 
the Rome Statute, this may not always be the case.229 For ex-
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ample, there may be state parties that adopt draft legislation 
that actually lends support to or even lowers the maximum 
penalties below the thirty years provided by the Rome Stat-
ute.230 Regardless, the theories of punishment, especially re-
storative justice to the victims and the community, would be 
best satisfied by giving deference to a nation’s draft implement-
ing legislation.231 Therefore, “complementarity,” “implementa-
tion,” draft legislation, and the different theories of punish-
ment all lend support to giving deference to how a nation would 
sentence an individual who has committed an international 
crime in its territory. 
V. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
As discussed, the criticisms of the ICTY and ICTR left the 
drafters of the Rome Statute in pursuit of sentencing provi-
sions that would result in greater consistency in sentencing.232 
The drafters of the Rome Statute chose to continue the balanc-
ing of mitigating, aggravating, and individual circumstances 
with the gravity of the crime.233 However, the Rome Statute 
included the additional use of a thirty-year imprisonment limi-
tation that would be applicable in almost all cases.234 Finally, 
the Rome Statute differed from the guidelines governing the 
ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL when it did not include the provision 
requiring deference to national law.235 
Unfortunately, in a possible attempt to reach more consistent 
results, the drafters of the Rome Statute granted the ICC judg-
es too much discretion and failed to account for the theories of 
punishment. Lubanga’s case demonstrates that the problems 
that existed in the ICTY and ICTR have carried over to the ICC 
and will likely result in further inconsistencies in the future. 
However, rather than focus solely on “consistency,” the drafters 
of the Rome Statute should have given more consideration to 
the discretion granted to judges, the theories of punishment, 
and the purposes that the punishment of international crimi-
nals should serve. 
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First, the thirty-year imprisonment provision should be re-
moved. Even if the thirty-year limitation leads to greater con-
sistency in sentencing, it will do little to deter criminals by im-
posing sentences that are too lenient, thereby failing the theo-
ries of punishment and resulting in minimal justice for vic-
tims.236 Hence, by focusing only on consistency, the ICC is fail-
ing to recognize its most important purpose, to punish “the 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the inter-
national community.”237 However, by deferring to national leg-
islation, any state party concerns regarding the removal of the 
thirty-year imprisonment provision may be counterbalanced.238 
Additionally, deferring to national legislation will often provide 
a sentencing range, including a minimum, 239 making it more 
difficult for the ICC to arbitrarily sentence perpetrators. 
Second, finding a solution for the balance of mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances is a more challenging endeavor. 
However, allowing the ICC broad discretion to choose the 
standards of proof used to evaluate these circumstances does 
not aid the situation. Alternatively, the same standard of proof 
should be used for both mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances, whether that standard is balancing of the probabili-
ties, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or an intermediate 
standard of proof such as clear and convincing evidence.240 This 
will serve to remove some judicial discretion and lead to sen-
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tences that fairly and equitably balance both positive and nega-
tive considerations relating to the defendant. 
Finally, the ICC should reinstate the provision of the ICTY, 
ICTR, and SCSL that allow for deference to the law of the na-
tion, and specifically allow for at least some deference to drafts 
of implementing legislation. Although this may not result in 
consistency on the international level, it would result in con-
sistency on the national level by taking away some of the broad 
discretion granted to the ICC; and most importantly, it would 
cater to the theories of punishment. First, it connects the “de-
parture from international sentencing guidelines to a State’s 
domestic law” or implementation law. 241 This in turn “both jus-
tifies its reasoning to the international community, and assures 
the domestic constituency that local values will be considered 
and protected.”242 Second, it forces the court to “express its rea-
soning, avoiding reliance on discretion alone.”243 This would, in 
effect, limit the ICC’s broad discretion and force it to better 
serve the injured nation.244 
By implementing all of these changes, the ICC would ulti-
mately use the relevant nation’s draft legislation as a guideline 
for the sentence, mitigating and aggravating circumstances 
would be equally weighed into the sentencing equation, and the 
thirty-year provision would no longer apply. These changes 
would better serve all of the theories of punishment. First, with 
national legislation providing a different sentence range based 
on the offense, and the removal of the thirty-year limitation, 
the sentences would be “proportional” to the offence committed 
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and better satisfy the theory of retribution. Second, the remov-
al of the thirty-year limitation and the equal weighing of miti-
gating and aggravating circumstances would provide for 
harsher sentences, strengthening the general deterrent effect. 
Finally, by deferring to draft legislation, the nation itself will 
weigh in on the sentence, helping to restore justice to that na-
tion. 
In the end, Lubanga is the first and only case the ICC has 
considered. With proper changes to its sentencing guidelines, 
the ICC can be a strong enforcer of international criminal law 
that deters future offenders, punishes perpetrators based on 
their true moral culpability, and brings restorative justice to 
the nations involved. 
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